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Introduction 
From a crisis of the state in Greece to bankruptcy in the city of Detroit, the effects of austerity 
have had stunning policy implications in much of Europe and North America since the ‘great 
recession’ started in 2007-8. The history of contemporary austerity is remarkable for how 
quickly policy consensus was established between global economic institutions, central banks 
and national policy makers. After a short flirtation with policies which promoted economic 
stimulus, politicians in country after country made the case for the necessity of “fiscal 
consolidation” or austerity, often pushed by the large international lending institutions, such as 
the IMF, World Bank and the European Central Bank. National (and sub-national) varieties of 
austerity were rolled out across much of Europe and the US, much as it had been across 
developing countries in previous decades.  
 
The crisis originated in the sub-prime mortgage debacle in the US, where poor quality debt was 
repackaged and rebranded in global financial markets as high yield and low risk. When many of 
those debts went bad, the repercussions quickly reverberated around the global banking system. 
By saving the global financial system (recapitalizing the banks and adding liquidity to the 
banking system), the private banking crisis was rebranded as a public sovereign-debt crisis and 
blamed on profligate government spending of peripheral European countries.This, despite the 
fact that none of these countries, except for Greece, had problematic budget deficits before the 
crisis. Thus, the private debt crisis became a public debt crisis, in what Mark Blyth (2013: 73) 
called the “greatest bait and switch in modern history.”  
 
This special issue brings together some of the most influential articles on austerity published by 
the Cambridge Journal of Economics, The Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 
and Contributions to Political Economy, which reflect on the history, theoretical justification, 
and the spatial and social implications of austerity policies. This remarkable range of articles 
explores the political economy of austerity policies – its intellectual origins and justifications, the 
politics and politicking surrounding austerity, and its uneven spatial and distributional 
implications.  
 
The Economics of Austerity: The Rise and Fall of Keynesian  
Konzelmann’s article “The Political Economics of Austerity” (2014) sets the stage for 
understanding the evolution of ideas about economic austerity. After World War Two, when the 
welfare state was firmly in place – and its social and political popularity protected it from serious 
cut-backs – austerity took a periodic macroeconomic form, designed to stabilise economic 
activity, protect employment, prevent inflation and avert financial crises. Steeply progressive tax 
regimes ensured that the cost of these measures was borne proportionately more by the better-
off. As a result, during the decades that followed, egalitarianism and an extended period of 
economic growth delivered greater economic equality and unprecedented improvements in living 
standards.  
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However, this social and economic progress was undermined, as Kalecki (1943) had predicted, 
by the failure to create social and political institutions capable of supporting continuously high 
levels of employment. State management of the economy was ultimately destabilized by the 
crisis-ridden 1970s, which also discredited worker-friendly legislation, trade union organisation 
and collective bargaining. The resulting counter-reaction to Keynesianism was led by neo-liberal 
theorists, who portrayed unemployment as a “natural” phenomenon – made worse by trade union 
activity, legally enforceable labour market regulation and overly-generous welfare provisions – 
casting doubts on the wisdom of efforts to maintain full employment. As the stagflationary crisis 
of the 1970s progressed, neo-liberal theory – that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and 
unemployment is explained by labour market imperfections – came to be regarded as the 
alternative to Keynesianism. From this perspective, austerity has a central role to play in 
maintaining price stability by directing the economy back towards the “natural” rate of 
unemployment. During the decades that followed, the neo-liberal challenge to the Keynesian 
orthodoxy was ultimately successful; and the focus of policy shifted away from attempting to 
maintain a full employment level of effective demand and stable prices, leaving employment to 
market forces, with joblessness being considered a personal – rather than a systemic – problem.  
 
Between 1979 and 2008, governments of all political persuasions pursued neo-liberal economic 
policies with emphasis on labour and financial market deregulation and macroeconomic 
strategies emphasising monetary control. Economic policy has alternated between the unleashing 
of debt-fuelled consumer binges and excessive asset speculation, followed by the imposition of 
deep austerity measures when bubbles burst. Having abandoned control of international capital 
movements and the supply of money, governments have effectively discarded the levers that they 
previously relied upon to regulate the financial sector and to manage deficit-financing and debt 
reduction. However, without these means, economies are prey to hostile speculation in 
international financial markets and the risks to fiscal budgets of rising interest rates and debt 
servicing costs. In this respect, as Greece and other weaker members of the Eurozone are 
discovering, the votes of speculators in financial markets carry more weight in determining 
economic and employment policy and outcomes than do those of the electorate. In this context, 
Konzelmann (2014) concludes that the only clear beneficiaries of austerity are financial 
speculators, with their proven ability to hold governments to ransom.  
 
Austerity, Public Debt and Growth 
Since the 1980s, one consequence of adopting neo-liberal policies has been the slowing-down of 
growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the advanced industrial economies, with deep 
recessions during the early 1980s and 1990s that played an important part in decimating 
manufacturing and increasing import dependency. Slumps have been followed by unsustainable 
bubbles, inflated by increasing supplies of low cost credit from the progressively deregulated 
financial sector. The latest credit bubble burst in 2007, bringing bank lending virtually to a halt 
and precipitating a world-wide crash of monumental proportions.  
 
The initial response by governments was to rescue systemically important (but failing) financial 
institutions and to reflate their economies. But increasing the money supply – a policy termed 
“quantitative easing” – has had little effect in stimulating the economy because the underlying 
problem was not a shortage of supply but rather a lack of demand for credit, in no small part by 
pessimistic consumers whose debt-financed spending had supported earlier bubbles. Instead, 
quantitative easing has acted as a sort of “blood transfusion” for struggling banks, boosting the 
 3 
 
prices of financial assets and stabilising the institutions that hold them. In 2010, after emergency 
stimulus measures and bank bailouts had apparently averted financial collapse, there was a 
policy reversal to economic austerity. This was partly due to a similar volte-face on the part of 
the financial markets, which having cried-out for a rescue in the wake of the financial crisis, now 
felt emboldened to challenge countries that were subsequently burdened with high levels of 
public debt.  
 
The theoretical justification for austerity was provided by Harvard economists, Carmen Reinhart 
and Kenneth Rogoff; and this was seized upon by politicians wanting to reverse course. Reinhard 
and Rogoff’s (2009) study of the long-term historical relationship between public debt and 
economic growth suggests that following a financial crisis, output and employment recover very 
slowly and that the average duration of debt over-hang episodes is 23 years. This implies a 
substantial cumulative loss in output, raising concerns about the long-term negative 
consequences of high levels of public debt. From this, they conclude that in the current context, 
since growth is slower when public debt is high, austerity is required to reduce public debt-to-
GDP ratios to growth-permitting levels. Their 2010 study goes further, identifying a public debt 
“threshold” – 90 percent of GDP – at which economic growth contracts. Economic analysts, the 
international financial elite and, most importantly, politicians, embraced these findings as the 
academic justification for austerity policies. 
 
However, Reinhard and Rogoff’s research faced substantial and growing criticism – until their 
findings were ultimately discredited. Scholars checking their results soon came to question the 
dataset, since no one was able to replicate them. When Reinhart and Rogoff eventually allowed 
researchers at the University of Massachusetts Amherst access to their database, Herndon, Ash 
and Pollin (“Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A critique of 
Reinhart and Rogoff”, 2014) discovered omitted data, methodological problems and Excel 
coding errors, which when corrected caused the stagnation threshold to disappear. But despite 
the strong refutation of their findings – and the implications this has for the austerity 
programmes they were used to justify – Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) have dismissed them as 
“academic kerfuffle”, maintaining that austerity is a sound policy in the current context on the 
grounds that since public debt levels are high, growth is slower than it otherwise would be.  
 
In sharp contrast to Reinhard and Rogoff’s findings, examining the relationship between the 
government’s stance on public debt for 11 OECD countries between 1881 and 2011, 
McCausland and Theodossiou (The Consequences of Fiscal Stimulus on Public Debt: a 
Historical Perspective”, 2016) find that fiscal austerity is associated with a deterioration in 
public debt as a percentage of GDP, with a damaging effect on economic recovery and growth. 
They conclude that during periods of recession, policies aimed at reducing public deficits not 
only worsen the public debt-to-GDP ratio; they also increase unemployment. 
 
Budgetary Effects of Austerity 
The ideas that have been used to justify economic austerity – like Reinhard and Rogoff’s public 
debt threshold – have a long (and chequered) history (Konzelmann, 2014). One of the most 
enduring of these is the idea that governments’ budgets are comparable to those of households 
and that they therefore requiring balancing. From this perspective, when public deficits and debts 
are high – just as when households and firms have accumulated too much debt – it is necessary 
to suffer the “pain” of austerity to eliminate them; anything less is considered fiscally 
irresponsible. However, Konzelmann points out that unlike a private firm or household, a 
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sovereign government that issues its own currency and has a floating exchange rate is not 
operationally constrained by its budget, because it can both issue and adjust the value of its 
currency to manage a deficit. Moreover, whilst a firm or household can balance its budget by 
reducing spending and repaying its debts, a government cannot: during a recession, government 
deficits rise as a consequence of falling tax revenues and rising unemployment-related social 
costs, putting upward pressure on public debt levels at the same time as GDP growth is slowing. 
In this context, a programme of economic austerity will not only deepen the slump it will also 
add to public debt. 
 
Considering the historical record in Europe, Boyer’s analysis (“The Four Fallacies of 
Contemporary Austerity Policies: the Lost Keynesian Legacy”, 2012) reveals that the approach 
of the European Central Bank, driven by Germany, fails to recognize that German austerity and 
Southern Europe’s debt-led consumption are two sides of the same coin. Since the advent of the 
Euro, as a result of tight fiscal policy and slow growth in real wage rates relative to productivity 
increases, there has been only a modest (5 percent) increase in aggregate demand in Germany. 
This compares with a 30 percent increase in the rest of the Eurozone, much of which is 
accounted for by debt-financed consumption and the wealth effect of asset bubbles. Put another 
way, Germany’s export-led growth is a consequence of importing by the rest of Eurozone; and 
Europe experienced cumulative increases in Germany’s trade surpluses, resulting in deficits in 
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain. “Over-consumption” in the rest of Europe therefore plays an 
important part in realising the surplus generated by “under-consumption” in Germany. However, 
this balance is threatened by the negative demand effects of generalized austerity, when all 
countries are required to cut-back demand and to attempt to improve competitiveness by making 
labour cheaper and more flexible.  
 
Similarly, Bibow (“On the Franco-German Euro Contradiction and Ultimate Euro Battleground”, 
2013) shows that Germany’s anti-Keynesian approach to economic policy since the early 1980s 
succeeded (for Germany) because other European countries supported its export growth. Tracing 
the Franco-German relationship from the creation of the Eurozone, Bibow shows that growth in 
France was driven by domestic demand – largely consumption – with imports acting as a drag 
upon it. He argues that this, combined with France’s more recent embrace of economic austerity 
policies, wage restraint and labour market liberalisation, will make it very difficult for the 
European project to survive. 
 
In the case of America, Pollin (“US Government Deficits and Debt Amid the Great Recession: 
what the Evidence Shows”, 2012) shows how the neo-liberal claim – that the 2009 economic 
stimulus programme in the US led to rising interest rates and inflation as well as excessive 
government debt – is unsupported by the facts. Federal government interest payments are at 
near-historic lows; and the reason why the stimulus programme did not lead immediately to a 
strong recovery was because of the severity of the financial crisis and resulting recession, which 
led to the collapse of household wealth and the seizing-up of credit markets for smaller 
businesses. Moreover, Taylor et al. (“Fiscal Deficits, Economic Growth and Government Debt in 
the USA”, 2012) show that over the last 50 years in the US, fiscal expansion has repeatedly 
resulted in higher economic growth, especially during recessions. 
 
“Expansionary” Austerity and the “Confidence Faeries” 
“Ricardian equivalence” is another idea that has been invoked to justify economic austerity 
(Barro, 1974). Ricardo, himself, was sceptical about the practical relevance of his notion of 
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equivalence, since he was doubtful that people are “rational” in the way economists assume them 
to be. Yet proponents of austerity assume that consumer and business decisions are based on 
(rational) expectations about the future, claiming that if the government cuts spending and 
reduces borrowing, private sector spending will increase to fill the gap. They reason that when 
public deficits and indebtedness are high, private sector spending can be expected to be weak 
because households and firms – anticipating future tax increases to fund the public sector deficit 
– are increasing savings to provide for this. Conversely, if governments promise to cut spending 
and reduce deficits, the resulting expectations of lower future taxes are assumed to cause current 
savings to fall and private sector consumption and investment to increase, offsetting the fall in 
public spending, with a positive impact on growth.  
 
Using this logic, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) revived the (discredited) “expansionary fiscal 
consolidation” hypothesis – a term first used by Gianazzi and Pagano (1990) to describe the 
experiences of countries like Denmark (1983-1986) and Ireland (1987-1989), that had grown 
despite sharp fiscal consolidations during the 1980s – to dismiss concerns about imposing 
economic austerity on a severely depressed economy. This hypothesis postulates that reducing 
government spending can be expected to generate increased growth as a consequence of the 
resulting increase in private sector confidence. However, many scholars have challenged their 
reasoning. Kinsella (“Is Ireland Really the Role Model for Austerity?” , 2012) argues that Ireland 
was only able to reduce its fiscal deficit between 1987 and 1989 as a result of favourable 
macroeconomic conditions – including growth in the international economy, fiscal transfers from 
the European Union and currency devaluation in 1986 – which are not currently available.  
 
Additionally, Foresti and Marani (“Expansionary Fiscal Consolidations: Theoretical 
Underpinnings and their Implications for the Eurozone”, 2014) show that expansionary fiscal 
consolidations cannot be the result of purely fiscal policies and that the main determinants of 
these phenomena are falling interest rates and/or national currency devaluations. But since 
interest rates are currently very low in the Eurozone – and exchange rate devaluation cannot 
occur – austerity is not a credible response to the current crisis. Considering the case of Spain, 
Fishman (“Anomalies of Spain's Economy and Economic Policy-making”, 2012) argues that 
structural problems afflicting the economy have contributed to chronically high levels of 
unemployment and that labour market and financial deregulation – combined with a programme 
of generalised economic austerity – will not resolve the crisis.  
 
As a result of their reliance on confidence, since the turn to austerity in 2010, “[t]hose who 
advocated austerity on the grounds of indirect confidence effects became known (pejoratively) as 
austerians and/or confidence faeries” (Considine and Duffy, “Keynes and the Confidence 
Faeries” 2016, p. 310, emphasis added). Considine and Duffy caution that from a theoretical 
point of view, despite Keynes’s acknowledgement of a role for confidence and budgetary 
discipline – and his recognition of a relationship between the two – he placed much greater 
emphasis on the role of confidence in the investment channel than in the consumption one. 
Keynes also argued that during a slump, uncertainty about future demand could be expected to 
undermine business confidence – and hence investment – leading to extended periods of 
involuntary unemployment; in this context, there is a positive role for counter-cyclical 
government spending.  
 
Using this logic, Sawyer (“The Tragedy of UK Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of the Financial 
Crisis”, 2012) argues that in the current context, efforts to reduce the deficit should be postponed 
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until the recovery is fully underway because it is only then that such efforts can succeed.This is 
as the consequence of multiplier effects of additional government spending when the economy is 
operating significantly below capacity. During a period of economic expansion, employment and 
income grow together, contributing to increasing tax receipts relative to public expenditure and 
reducing national debt as a proportion of GDP. By contrast, when the economy is severely 
depressed, as it currently is, fiscal retrenchment will only deepen and extend the recession.  
 
In short, until there are real signs of economic recovery, providing businesses with confidence 
that the returns from increasing investment and employment will be adequate, confidence cannot 
be expected to lead the recovery. The point here is that it is the immediate past and current 
experiences – not long term rational expectations – which determine investor and consumer 
confidence and, by extension, their current action; and when this confidence is low (as it 
currently is), austerity can be expected to reinforce pessimism, adding further twists to the 
vicious cycle of falling demand, investment, employment and incomes.  
 
From Private to Public Debt Crisis 
Coates (“Dire Consequences: the Conservative Recapture of America’s Political Narrative?” 
2012) argues that the neo-liberal interpretation has misrepresented the causes of the financial 
crisis and resulting world recession; and in so doing, it has captured the foreground of the current 
policy debate. The initial return to Keynesianism, which steadied the world economy in the wake 
of the crisis, was short-lived. Further – largely in response to the financial markets’ increasingly 
negative attitude towards high levels of sovereign debt – there was a sharp change in policy tack, 
from stimulus to austerity. However, as is frequently the case with markets, the negativity had 
self-fulfilling consequences: it translated into higher borrowing costs, which, in turn, made debt 
increasingly burdensome, further fuelling the markets’ nervousness and feeding the vicious 
speculative cycle. The neo-liberal view gives priority to the reduction of fiscal deficits as the 
route to recovery. This, it is argued, soothes the sensitive bond markets and keeps the cost of 
borrowing down, encouraging private productive investment, whilst cutting back on such 
unproductive public sector spending as transport, education and health.  
 
Whilst the academic debate has focused primarily on the theorized economic effects of a policy 
of austerity rather than stimulus – supported by an observed inverse correlation between public 
debt-to-GDP ratios and GDP growth – policymakers (although not all politicians) are beginning 
to accept that austerity is slowing growth and hindering recovery (Konzelmann, 2014). But they 
also recognise that, despite having been rescued from meltdown (for which they, themselves, 
were largely responsible), the global financial markets are now demanding austerity – not 
because of its economic effects, but as “credible” evidence that governments are serious about 
managing their budgets and re-paying their debts. Moreover, because indebted governments are 
heavily reliant on the financial markets for funding, they are vulnerable to pressure from 
speculative investors seeking short-term gains. The irony, however, is that in the current context 
of prolonged economic recession, further austerity can only depress GDP and increase public 
debt, prolonging the negative market responses and intensifying the crisis. The likely effect of 
this is a social and political backlash if governments continue to pander to the interests of the 
financial sector by avoiding the re-regulation demanded by the current parlous state of both the 
financial system and the real economy.  
 
Thus, what had begun as a largely private debt crisis morphed into a sovereign debt crisis as 
investors refused to lend to governments they judged to be actually or potentially insolvent. And 
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in an effort to calm the bond markets, Central Banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
imposed tough austerity measures as a condition for their financial support, effectively shifting 
the onus of the crisis from the financial sector to the state.
1
 
 
The Politics of Austerity 
As this suggests, one recurring theme in the articles for this special issue is the politics of 
contemporary austerity – from the functioning of the democratic system, to the multiple ways 
that politicians have embraced certain academic research, to the narrative framing of austerity 
policies as without alternatives. Europe’s financial and sovereign state crises have been as 
damaging for democracy as it has been for some of the Eurozone countries’ economies. In 2011, 
Italy’s elected prime minister was replaced by Mario Monti, an economist and former European 
commissioner, who was brought in to provide technocratic approaches to politically sensitive 
budget cuts and in so doing, to reassure market analysts monitoring Italy’s public debt. Likewise, 
in Greece, Lucas Papademos, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece, was appointed as the 
Greek Prime Minister to implement tough austerity measures that never received public 
backing.As Skelton (2011) argues both examples have upended the democratic process and 
produced a “government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats.”This feeling 
was further reinforced for many when the EU institutions pushed through further austerity 
measures in Greece, despite the public’s strong rejection of these policies in a referendum in 
2015.  
 
The US has seen similar effects on the democratic process, albeit at a different scale. Peck 
(“Pushing Austerity: State Failure, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Crises of Fiscal Federalism in 
the USA”, 2014) details the relationship between a well-orchestrated public narrative of the 
profligate state and the justification for severe levels of state and municipal austerity. He details 
the ideological assault of a conservative political and intellectual infrastructure which produced a 
“self-fulfilling narrative of state crisis.” Thus, the US federal state has offloaded “the costs and 
risks of market failure” to the state and city, on a scale which has contributed to a number of 
cities – suchas Detroit, Vallejo and Sacramento – declaring bankruptcy. Peck examines the 
national political and policy context whereby cities with large debts were forced to declare 
municipal bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the US bankruptcy code. This entailed the imposition 
of a city manager to replace an elected mayor in order to bypass local political pressures in order 
to implement city-level austerity cuts. Peck argues that this city-level version of austerity was 
appointed not just to impose unpopular cuts, but to punish public sector unions, renegotiate 
public sector pension obligations and restructure public sector service delivery. Thus, together, 
these measures are intended to produce not only a selective dismantling of the state and local 
government, but a “deunionized nightwatchman state.”  
 
Davidson and Ward (“‘Picking up the Pieces’: Austerity Urbanism, California and Fiscal 
Crisis”2014) examine the politics of this selective dismantling of the local state in great detail. 
They argue that California cities were at the forefront of a speculative urbanism whereby “cities 
speculate on future economic growth by borrowing against predicted future revenue streams to 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that from an economic perspective it matters greatly whether a country has control over its 
currency because countries that do – like the US and UK – are not operationally constrained by their budget; if 
necessary, they can borrow from the Central Bank to assure bondholders that they will not default. By contrast, 
Eurozone members neither issue their own currency nor have a floating exchange rate; they are therefore 
vulnerable to speculative raids by financial exchange traders and they are subject to the conditionalities – i.e., 
austerity – imposed by lenders, including the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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make this growth more likely” (Davidson and Ward, 2014: 84) They argue that the municipal 
bankruptcies in California created a new political landscape “where just the threat of going broke 
can be used to impose draconian neo-liberal reforms” (Davidson and Ward, 2014: 85) Thus, 
formally untouchable public services, such as fire and police, street lighting and cleaning, are 
now routinely targeted by cities burdened with high levels of debt.  
 
 
Others also highlight the larger political economy as contemporary austerity and argue that 
austerity is a class project that seeks to roll back the welfare state. Crotty (“The 
Great Austerity War: What Caused the US Deficit Crisis and Who Should Pay to Fix It?”, 2012) 
and Callinicos (“Commentary: Contradictions of Austerity”, 2012) suggest that a case for 
austerity can only be made if it is considered as part of the evolution of capitalism and the 
balance of power within it towards wealthy households, economically dominant firms (especially 
financial ones), conservative politicians and right-wing activists. They argue that the historical 
and comparative evidence does not support the “Treasury view” that government deficits and 
public debt squeeze-out private sector expenditure and are therefore economically damaging. 
Similarly, in the case of the Eurozone, Palley (“Europe's Crisis without End: The Consequences 
of Neoliberalism”, 2013) argues that – rather than being the cause of the Eurozone crisis – the 
public debt crisis is merely the latest stage. But its appearance has permitted neo-liberal 
politicians to push their long-standing agenda of fiscal austerity and their attack on the social 
democratic welfare state. Thus, the class analytics of austerity suggest that austerity is more 
explicable as a project that seeks to roll back the welfare state and, in so doing, shift power 
between classes. 
 
The process of financialisation and the economic interests that drive it are perhaps most 
observable in the micro-state of Iceland. Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir’s analysis (“Iceland’s Rise, 
Fall, Stabilisation and Beyond”, 2012) of the evolution of the political economy of Iceland 
demonstrates the social forces leading up to the financial crisis. They demonstrate how well-
organized elites made use of neo-liberal ideology to not only liberalise and financialise the 
markets in which they held dominant positions; they also used it to justify the advantages they 
subsequently derived. However, when the inevitable crisis arrived, a new left-wing government – 
a coalition of social democrats and a left-green movement – came into power and the banks were 
allowed to go bankrupt. There were cuts in public spending; and these were relatively less severe 
than in other post-crisis countries because of a very sharp devaluation of the krona, that led to a 
growth in natural resource exports. However, Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir conclude that Iceland’s 
future remains uncertain, as the old political elite waits in the wings, eager to resume the strategy 
of becoming an international financial centre and exporter of raw materials.  
 
All in it together? Austerity for whom?  
The UK’s chancellor, George Osborne, famously claimed that the costs of austerity were evenly 
spread throughout society; that in his words “we are all in it together”. However, a number of 
authors challenge this by highlighting the uneven distribution of the burdens of austerity. As 
noted above, Crotty (2012) and Callinicos (2012) highlight the broad political economy of class 
divisions in understanding the form and structure of contemporary austerity. This theme is 
extended in Peck (2014) and Davidson and Ward (2014) which highlight how public sector 
workers have been under constant attack in austerity budget cuts. Public sector workers’ 
relatively protected position in the labour market - with stable jobs, strong unions, and good 
pensions – made them the ideological target of the austerians at the national and local levels of 
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government. Loboa and Adua (“State Rescaling and Local Governments' Austerity Policies 
Across the USA, 2001–2008”, 2011) come to similar conclusions in their detailed study of 
county-level responses to budget cuts in the US, including the lay-offs and hiring freezes, service 
cuts and privatization. They find that “counties with a higher proportion of unionized employees 
are more likely to report lay-offs and hiring freezes” and that “more professionalized and 
unionized governments are more likely to have privatized a service” (Loboa and Adua, 2011: 
428-30). They conclude, “austerity policy is clearly related to public sector unionization. Hiring 
freezes, lay-offs and service cuts are reported more frequently by counties with a higher 
proportion of organized workers” (Loboa and Adua, 2011: 432). However, other divisions were 
just as clear, based on race, age, and gender. 
 
Donald et al. (“Austerity in the City: Economic Crisis and Urban Service Decline?”, 2014) argue 
that the spatial and social polarisation of poverty in US cities has intensified under austerity. 
They examine racially segregated neighbourhoods with concentrated poverty levels in San 
Francisco and show that not only is average income lower, but that this has increased since the 
financial crisis. They also argue that these racially segregated neighbourhoods have fewer 
resources such as good schools and open spaces; host unwanted land uses such as contaminated 
sites, and disproportionately higher exposure to pollution. Thus, “income and racial inequality 
are inter-woven and reinforced with poor schooling, less healthy environments and less well-
being on the neighbourhood scale” (Donald et al., 2014: 8).  
 
Davidison and Ward (2014) and Donald et al. (2014) also argue that many of the cities and states 
witnessing the most extreme forms of austerity have suffered from structural problems associated 
with a long history of deindustrialization, racial segregation and discrimination and anaemic 
growth. The history of race, discrimination and segregation is intimately tied up with the history 
of deindustrialisation in a city such as Detroit, and the bankruptcies of Detroit, Michigan, and the 
withdrawal of direct democracy are interpreted and understood by many through the prism of 
race (Davidson and Ward, 2014). 
 
Donald et al.’s (2014) work also highlights how the young have been disproportionately hurt by 
austerity measures in the UK and in the US. Both countries have seen an increase in child 
poverty since the onset of austerity budget cuts. There is a myriad of ways in which the financial 
crisis affects the young – though reduced education budgets, reductions in benefits to low 
income families, and reduced youth service provision. They state: “the UK(‘s) progress on 
reducing child poverty has fallen back, in part in response to austerity cutbacks in programmes 
designed to help poor families and children access goods including heating, food, decent housing 
and the basics” (Donald et al., 2014: 10). 
 
The uneven effects of austerity are also seen in the gendered implications of cuts to the welfare 
system. MacLeavy (“A ‘New Politics’ of Austerity, Workfare and Gender? The UK Coalition 
Government's Welfare Reform Proposals”, 2011) examines the then-proposed changes to the 
UK’s welfare system. She argues that women were the primary beneficiaries of the modern 
welfare state and that the reforms to the UK welfare regime under contemporary austerity 
measures undermine women’s financial security and autonomy. This, in turn, undermines 
support for their dual roles in production and social reproduction, or care work and paid work. 
She finds women as a group are particularly reliant on benefits and tax credits and that “middle-
class parents struggling to reconcile work and family life will suffer a loss of income from lower 
limits for tax credits, whilst unemployed single parents face heightened expectations to 
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participate rather than withdraw from the paid labour market whilst performing care” 
(MacLeavy, 2011: 360). Glasmeier and Lee-Chuvala (“Austerity in America: Gender and 
Community Consequences of Restructuring the Public Sector”, 2011) make a similar argument 
in the US context – they argue that women have been an important beneficiary of the expansion 
of welfare state – particularly in the public sector and the “semi-public economy”. They 
conclude that “this era (of austerity) will have its biggest impact over the long run on jobs 
currently occupied by women, many of whom support families and children” (Glasmeier and 
Lee-Chuvala 2011: 471). 
  
The Geography of Austerity 
Another key theme emerging from the papers in this virtual issue is the geography of austerity 
policies and their uneven impact across Europe and the United States. Scholars in this virtual 
issue write about all scales of this geography, ranging from the individual to the neighbourhood 
to the city to the region/state to the nation-state to the European Union and Eurozone. 
 
In Europe, for example, Kitson et al., (“The Geographies of Austerity”, 2011) document through 
maps of regional unemployment during the depths of the 2008-2010 recession how the largest 
negative effects are found in the weaker economic regions of the European Union. They argue 
that many of the state-induced austerity responses have slowed the recovery of many of these 
weaker regions. Most notable is the emergence of a very pronounced core-periphery model 
where the southern countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are in a much weaker position 
than their Northern European counterparts like Germany and Austria. These pronounced patterns 
of the core-periphery model have continued unabated in subsequent years (Eurostat, 2016). 
 
This isn’t just an academic observation, they note, but rather “[t]he diversity of experience across 
the regions of Europe since the onset of the crisis and subsequent austerity responses represents a 
significant setback to one of the most central goals of the Union, namely to reduce regional 
variations in inequality and opportunity” (Kitson et al., 2011, p. 294). Indeed, since they wrote 
that paper five years ago, there has been an unprecedented surge of Euroskeptics and outright 
anti-EU politicians and political platforms, most notable the recent debate and referendum in 
Britain over exiting the EU (Stewart, 2016). 
 
The United States has also seen a highly differentiated spatial impact of austerity policies. As 
several authors note in these articles, the subprime mortgage crisis which triggered the banking 
crisis and then the recession and subsequent state-austerity responses was not US-wide but rather 
rooted in particular cities and regions across the states of Florida, Nevada, California and 
Michigan. California, in particular was “ground zero” for the Great Recession and sub-prime 
mortgage crisis (Bardhan and Walker, “California Shrugged: Fountainhead of the Great 
Recession”, 2011, Davidson and Ward, 2014). The impact of the subprime crisis was not 
consistent within states either, as clearly there were certain areas that were hit and others left 
untouched. 
 
Even before the sub-prime mortgage crisis, states and local governments were setting austerity 
policies across the United States. Both Peck (2014) and Davidson and Ward (2014) note how the 
post-crisis round of austerity responses is really part of a “widening and deepening” of a longer-
term trend of neo-liberalism. A more detailed analysis is Lobao and Adua (2011) research on the 
geography of local austerity policies in the US between 2001 and 2008 from over 1,700 counties. 
They found unique features of local bureaucracies, particularly administrative staff and 
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unionized workers, and governance pressures as significant in setting particular austerity policy 
responses. 
 
A further level of geography is found at the individual and intra-urban level, as austerity policies 
have not just affected certain cities but particular neighbourhoods and people within them. 
Donald et al. (2014) found examples of the growth of significant inequality at the neighbourhood 
level and the increase of extreme-poverty neighbourhoods across the US in general. Similarly in 
the UK, at the scale of the individual, group and neighbourhood level, Beatty and Fothergill 
(“The Local and Regional Impact of the UK’s Welfare Reforms”, 2014) have detailed the 
uneven nature of the welfare cuts that make up the UK government’s attempts to roll back the 
state’s support of the poor and unemployed. They found that national reforms to welfare have hit 
the low income and out-of work households most sharply. They show the impacts are most 
severe in the same regions that have undergone the worst of the economic restructuring during 
the past several decades, so Britain’s older industrial towns like Blackpool and some of the 
poorer London boroughs are hit the hardest. 
 
Conclusion 
Austerity is a threat to the whole of society as it not only creates sharp societal divisions but also 
threatens the foundations of democratic institutions and economic prosperity for all. Clearly, the 
burden of austerity is unevenly distributed – as workers in the public sector and the people and 
places which rely on public services and welfare benefits have been especially hard hit. The 
articles in this special issue also highlight how the impacts of austerity have affected populations 
differently across all countries and regions. In the final analysis the only way an economy can 
pay off its debts is by harnessing the productive capability of the majority to produce and add 
value. The authors in this special issue reveal – and a modicum of common sense confirms – that 
debt repayment cannot be readily achieved, if at all, by savagely cutting expenditure, creating 
unemployment, slowing economic growth and impoverishing swathes of a country’s population. 
The only effective way forward is a re-balancing of the economy away from a reliance on 
financial services and the demotion of finance to its role as the servant of enterprise, rather than 
its master. 
 
There are recent signs that the policy consensus around austerity is slowly disintegrating. At the 
recent G7 meeting in April 2016, national leaders seemed to agree to disagree on the best way 
forward – whether to encourage investment-led development or to continue to pursue austerity 
policies. Perhaps even more telling, a recent in-house article by IMF economists warn that an 
important part of the neoliberal agenda appears to have been “somewhat overplayed” (Ostry, et 
al., 2016). Ostry, Loungani and Furceri argue that the benefits of austerity, across a range of 
countries, are difficult to establish, inequality has risen as a result of austerity, and that increased 
inequality hurts the level and sustainability of growth. They go on to argue that although some 
countries have “little choice” in whether to pursue austerity policies, countries with a strong 
record of fiscal responsibility, such as the US, the UK, and Germany, do have the latitude “to 
decide not to raise taxes or cut productive spending when the debt level is high” (Ostry, et al., 
2016: 40). Further, they argue that the costs of lowering debt may be higher than potential 
benefits, since fiscal consolidation has produced lower levels of output, rather than higher levels. 
They conclude, “in the case of fiscal consolidation, the short-run costs in terms of lower output 
and welfare and higher unemployment have been underplayed, and the desirability for countries 
with ample fiscal space of simply living with high debt and allowing debt ratios to decline 
organically through growth is underappreciated” (ibid). We see in this, perhaps optimistically, 
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the beginnings of the international consensus starting to break down. This series of articles 
certainly contribute to this debate.  
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